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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROCTOR, on behalf
of her minor daughter, ANGELA
flf:fH PROCTOR,

,,<l'(,l\IJNE

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Civil No. 19288

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING.

CASE STATEMENT
Angela Proctor claims a right to life insurance policy
proceeds which were paid by Insurance Company of North
America to Shirley Fletcher Proctor, the "wife" of the
insured within the meaning of the policies and the intended
beneticiary.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial
Oio,trict Court heard Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment upon

stipulated facts, granted Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissed Appellant's Complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent, Life Insurance Company of North America
("LINA"), respectfully requests that judgment below be
affirmed and that respondent, LINA, be awarded its costs.

In

the alternative, this case should be remanded to the Trial
Court for further proceedings.
FACTS
On April 24, 1966, Willis Brent Proctor
Suzanne Proctor

("Suzanne") were married.

("Brent") and
(R. 314.)

Angela

Beth Proctor is the sole child of that marriage and is
Brent's sole surviving issue.

(R.

314.)

Suzanne sued for divorce and obtained an interlocutory
decree on March 13, 1968 after having separated from Brent.
(R.

314.)

The divorce became final three months after entry

of the interlocutory decree.

(R. 314.)

Before the divorce,

Brent participated in a marriage ceremony with Shirley
Fletcher Proctor

("Shirley") on July 15, 1967.

(R. 315.)

Subsequent to that marriage ceremony, Shirley and Brent
resided together as husband and wife continuously until
Brent's death in a motorcycle accident on September 29,
1980.

(R. 315.)

During the thirteen years they lived
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Brent held Shirley out to be his wife and his only
1 t,

1,iE;

Ile executed several documents indicating that she was
wife.

(R. 315, 316.)

Among them were loan applications

indicating Shirley to be his wife.

He filed joint Federal

tax returns with Shirley, sent her "anniversary cards" on the
anniversary of their marriage and generally represented to
puhlic, friends and family that Shirley was his sole wife for
all purposes.
In April, 1978, Brent purchased an accidental death
insurance policy from the respondent, LINA, through the
Chevron Travel Club, Inc.

(R. 313.)

On the face of the

Chevron Travel Club application was a printed box, above
which appeared:

"To indicate the level of Broad Coverage

Accidental Loss-Of-Life Insurance you want included in your
Chevron Travel Club Membership, affix your stamp here.
reverse for benefits of each Plan.)"

(R. 317.)

(See

Brent

attached a paper stamp which indicated that he had selected
Plan 2, the "Member and Spouse" Plan.

(R. 317.)

The reverse side of the Chevron Travel Club application
explained the four alternative insurance plans:
ber Only Plan";

(2) a "Member and Spouse Plan";

and Eligible Children Plan"; and
Eligible Children Plan".

(1) a "Mem(3) a "Member

(4) a "Member, Spouse and

By affixing this particular stamp

to his application, Brent selected a policy which insured
hoth his own life and that of his "spouse".

-3-

This policy of insurance provided that the named insured,
Brent, could designate a beneficiary.

If no beneficiary wer"

named, the proceeds would be payable to the first surviving
class of the following beneficiaries:
(2) child or children,
or sisters.

(1)

husband or wife,

(3) mother or father, or

(4) brothers

No specific individual beneficary was named by

Mr. Proctor in the policy.

(R.

313.)

In January, 1979, Brent and Shirley purchased a second
LINA policy of insurance through the Chevron Travel Club.
Again, Brent indicated that he wished to purchase insurance
under the "Member and Spouse Plan," this time by checking one
of four possible boxes on the application.

(R.

313, 318.)

No specific individual beneficiary was named in the second
application and, again, the proceeds of the policy were payable to the first surviving class of the following beneficiaries:

(1)

husband or wife,

mother or father, or

(2) child or children,

(4) brothers or sisters.

(R.

(3)
313.)

As a natural result of injuries sustained in an
automobile-motorcycle accident, Brent died on September 29,
1980.

(R.

314.)

The proceeds from the two insurance policies in the sum
of $46,701.50 were paid to Shirley by LINA as the only claimant under the policies.

(R. 314-15.)

There is an additional

$1,900 still to be paid from LINA pending direction of the
Court.

(R.

315.)
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE INSURANCE POLICIES WERE CONTRACTS
BETWEEN THE INSURED AND THE INSURER AND THE
LANGUAGE OF SUCH CONTRACTS MUST BE INTERPRETED IN LIGHT OF THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
This case hinges on the meaning of the word "wife" as
used in the two life insurance contracts.

The insured,

Brent, appears to have intended that the term "wife" mean
oncy Shirley and that she should receive the proceeds of the
policies.
The case of Bergera v.
P.2d 599

Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 524

(Utah 1974), presents an analogous situation.

In

Bergera, the issue was the meaning of the term "war" in a
life insurance policy which excluded coverage for death
resulting from war.

The insured died while serving in the

llnited States armed forces in Viet Nam.

The President had

never declared war in Viet Nam and the insured's beneficiaries claimed coverage.

The Court stated:

"The policy is

mPrely a contract between the insured and the insurer.

Its

should be construed pursuant to the same rules as
are applied to other ordinary contracts, to wit:
thereto intend by the language used?"
lc-mphasis added).

-5-

What did
Id. at 600

In Bergera, the term "war" was interpretPd according to
the meaning intended by the insured and the insurer and not.
according to any meaning expressed by Congress or the President.

It is clear that Congress had the power to define the

term "war".

Congress' definition, however, did not control

what the parties meant by the term "war" in a private contract.
Similarly, the insurance policies at issue in this case
must be interpreted according to the meaning intended and
understood by the insured

(Brent) and the insurer

(LINA) and

not according to the intent expressed by the state legislature.

Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins.

Co. of New York, 161 P.2d 423,

426

(1945)

("an insurance con-

tract like any other contract must be interpreted in the
light of the intention of the parties"); Cf. Woolery v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 641, 644
1976)

(E.D. Va.

(statutory definition controlled because the policy was

issued by the federal government under an Act of Congress);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Spearman,
(M.D. Ala. 1972)

344 F. Supp. 665

(statutory definition controlled because the

policy was issued by the federal government under an Act of
Congress).
As is the case of contracts generally, the cardinal principle pertaining to the construction and
interpretation of insurance contracts is that the

-6-

intention of the parties should control.
43 Am. Jur.
2c1 Insurance § 272 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
See
dlso the cases cited therein.
This Court has always held that "a contract made by parties should be construed so as to give effect to what the
l''"'tties intended at the time it was made."
584 P.2d 823, 824-25 (Utah 1978).
628 P. 2d 1289, 1291
P. 2d 207, 208

DuBois v. Nye,

See also O'Hara v. Hall,

(Utah 1981); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 389

(Utah 1965).
II.

THE INTENT OF THE INSURED CONTROLS THE
INTERPRETATION OF THESE PARTICULAR INSURANCE CONTRACTS, AND BRENT INTENDED THE PROCEEDS TO BE PAID TO SHIRLEY, THE PERSON HE
CONSIDERED TO BE HIS "WIFE".
The obvious purpose of LINA in articulating the classes
of individuals who would receive the benefits of the policies
was to specify who would be the beneficiaries if the insured
failed to name specific beneficiaries.

Conversely stated,

LINA's only purpose was to see that the proceeds of the policies were paid to those persons that the insured intended.
LINA did not foresee, nor could it have reasonably foreseen, that there would be a dispute over the meaning of the
term "wife" used in the language of the policy.

As the Utah

Supreme Court has stated:
ln resolving a dispute about the interpretation of
provisions in a contract the objective is to determine what the parties intended at the time it was

-7-

executed; and if the intent with respect to some
unforeseen subsequent occurrence was not clearly
articulated, what would have been their intent if
their minds had adverted to such an occurrence.
Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17
Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1965).
It was and is LINA'S intent to pay the policy proceeds to
the insured's intended, and only, beneficiary.

LINA's pur-

pose was only to identify the insured's intended beneficiary.

Brent's intent, therefore, controls.
In determining who the beneficiary of a life insurance

policy is, it is the intention of the insured which is the
controlling element.
3 8 Il 1. App.

Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold,

3d 6 5 8, 3 4 8 N. E. 2d 5 2 0, 5 2 3 ( Il 1. App. 19 7 6) ;

Pabst v. Hesse, 286 Minn.

33, 173 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1970);

Jenkins v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 207 So.

2d 255, 258 (La.

App. 1968); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rak, 24 Ill.

2d 128,

180 N.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1962).
The intention of the insured is the controlling element and almost any form of words which demonstrates
the insured's intention is sufficient.
Thus, the
fact that the beneficiaries in a life policy are
misdescribed as respects their relationship to the
insured generally will not result in the designation
of no beneficiary so as to disregard the intent of
the insured.
2 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice, § 781 (1966 & Supp. 1982) (footnotes omitted).
It is undisputed that Brent intended the LINA proceeds to
be paid to Shirley.

Brent purchased - years after his

divorce from Suzanne - an insurance plan which insured both

-8-

1

'i:

'·•'If

and his "spouse".

He obviously considered Shirley to

and held her out to the public, friends, family
1nJ

the government as his spouse.
It is clear that Brent considered Shirley to be his

sp"use for purposes of coverage under the insurance policy
and that he also considered Shirley to be his "spouse" for
purposes of payment of the insurance proceeds.

Had Shirley

predeceased Brent, LINA could not possibly have escaped its
ohligation under the insurance policies to pay death benefits
to Brent.

Shirley's life was insured under the policies as

the spouse of Brent and LINA was obligated to make payment if
she had predeceased Brent.

Conversely, Brent was an insured

under the policies and LINA was obligated to make payment of
the proceeds to Brent's spouse according to the policies.
It also appears clear that had Brent foreseen any question, he could have and would have designated Shirley as a
specific beneficiary under the policies.

See Union Pacific

R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra.
The Trial Court found that Brent relied upon the clause
whirh designated who would receive payment in lieu of a named
beneficiary believing that the proceeds would be paid to
Shirley.

-9-

I I I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTIES
INTENDED SHIRLEY TO BE THE BENEFICIARY
UNDER THE POLICIES IS A FINDING OF FACT
WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Appellant's Brief correctly states the proposition that
the interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a question of
law for the Court.

It is not invariably so, however.

"In

ascertaining the meaning of words in a contract the intention
of the parties is controlling and where it is susceptible of
different interpretations extraneous evidence is admissible
to show the intention."

Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart,

Inc., 18 Utah 2d 180, 417 P.2d 761, 764

(1966).

The appellant does not dispute that extraneous evidence
is admissible to explain an ambiguous term in a contract and
appellant correctly points out that a term of a contract is
not ambiguous merely because the parties to the contract urge
diverse interpretations upon the Court.

Here, however, the

one party to these insurance contracts whose intent is controlling was not before the Trial Court to testify as to his
intent.

The Trial Court, therefore, heard stipulated facts

to determine the intent of the parties.
Once extraneous evidence is properly admitted to determine the intent of the parties, the intent becomes a question
of fact.

Central Credit Collection Control Corp. v. Graysun,

-10-

' v<a';h.

App. 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972)

[quoted by the Utah

:;11pr eine

Court in Overson v. United States Fidelity

&

Guar.

587 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978)].
In the case below, the District Court heard Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment on stipulated facts.

The Court found

that Brent had intended the word "wife" to mean only Shirley
and intended Shirley to receive the proceeds of the insurance
policies as the beneficiary.

The Court's finding was sup-

ported by substantial evidence and must be sustained.

Leon

Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226,
227 (1971).

The evidence shows that Brent and Shirley lived

together as husband and wife for thirteen years.

Brent pur-

chased the policies indicating that his "wife" was to be not
only a beneficiary but an insured also.

Brent consistently

held Shirley out to be his wife for all purposes.

There can

be no doubt that the Trial Court's finding is supported by
substantial evidence.

IV.
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH BRENT AND SHIRLEY EACH CONSIDERED TO BE MATRIMONIAL IN NATURE CANNOT BE
RECOGNIZED FOR ANY PURPOSE UNDER UTAH LAW
IS INCORRECT.
It is clear that a marriage must be validly solemnized by
an authorized individual in order to be recognized under Utah

-11-

law for most purposes.

However, Utah law does allow invalid

marriages to be recognized for limited purposes.
Utah Code Ann •

§

3 0 -1 -1 7 • 1 ( 1 9 7 6 ) g i v e s u ta h Co u r ts th,

power to annul marriages which are prohibited or void.

The

Court also has extensive equitable powers to recognize the
parties' putative marriage relationship.

The Court ma:1 make

orders for alimony, child support, child custod:1 and child
visitation rights when annulling an invalid marriage.
Code Ann.

§

Utah

30-1-17.2 (1976); Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 1229

(Utah 1977); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P. 2d 1380, 1381-82
{Utah 1977).
1944)

See also Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. 2d 262 (Utar:

(prior to the new statute, attorney's fees could not

be

awarded to a "wife" seeking an annulment because no support
obligation existed without a valid marriage).

By granting a

Court order for alimony in a proceeding to annul a void marriage, the Court has power to recognize the parties' relationship and enforce marital obligations even though the marriage was "void" from the beginning.

These statutes allow

Utah Courts to recognize an invalid marriage in equity for
some limited purposes.
The case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568
F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1977), is directly on roint.

In

Irene Penn Manning was married to Thomas Gaines in 1941.
Irene and Thomas Gaines were separated in 1943, but werP n•it

-12-

J

rri•r1.

In 1956, Irene participated in a marriage ceremony

''' I ,Jwi:ird Manning and thereafter lived with Edward as his
,,,,,,

until 1975, when she died.

Irene's life was insured

a Fe·leral Employees Group Life Insurance policy.

J,,.J,

1

h3rl

not designated a specific beneficiary.

Irene

However, the

icy indicated that payment would be made according to a
fP1iPral statutory schedule which gave first priority to the
iccureJ's "widow" if no beneficiary were named.
The District Court relied upon Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d
6'H'

!9th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961)
5 U.S.C.A.

§

8105(a)

(overruled

(West Supp. 1983), and held that

E1ward Manning, and not Thomas Gaines, was entitled to the
insurance proceeds according to the "manifest intent" of the
insured.
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court did not question the
soundness of the "manifest intent" doctrine which had been
ajopted hy the federal courts in cases involving Federal
employees Group Life Insurance policies.

The "manifest

intent" doctrine required payment of proceeds to be made
according to the intent of the insured despite noncompliance
witb •he technicalities of naming a new beneficiary.
however, had subsequently amended 5 U.S.C.A.

Con§

8705(a)

IWPst S11pp. 1983) for reasons of administrative convenience
tn require strict compliance with statutory provisions for
nam1nq a beneficiary.
-13-

The Ninth Circuit Court held the District Court's reliance upon earlier cases erroneous, Metropolitan Life Ins.
v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 925-26, but affirmed the award of
the policy proceeds to Edward Manning upon different
grounds.

It found that Congress, as the insurer and by stat-

ute, intended that payment under the statutory scheme be made
to the "widow" of the insured as defined by the law of the
state where the insured was married or resided.

The validity

of Irene's marriage to Edward Manning was controlled by
Connecticut law.
Connecticut law, like Utah law, characterized a bigamous
marriage as "invalid".

However, a Connecticut statute

allowed its state courts to annul marriages which were void
or invalid.

The Connecticut statute, like the Utah statute,

allowed the Court to make orders for the payment of alimony
even where an annulment was granted on the grounds that the
marriage was void.

The Ninth Circuit Court, under a statute

very similar to the Utah statute, recognized the "marriage"
of Irene and Edward as having "sufficient legal effect to
entitle him to the proceeds of his wife's insurance even if
Gaines were able to prove satisfactorily that the marriage
was bigamous." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, supra,
at 929.

see also Perlstein v.

A.2d 909, 911-12

Perlstein, 152 Conn. 152, 204

(1964).
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Likewise, the marriage of Brent and Shirley has suffic

leqal effect to entitle Shirley to the insurance proas the wife of the insured.

Appellant is unable to

,·ile to any rule of law or public policy which would prevent
Limited recognition of this marriage relationship in equity
according to the intent of the insured.
J. Appleman,
1982)

See 2 J. Appleman &

Insurance Law and Practice, § 803 (1966 & Supp.

("most courts, under ordinary form policies in particu-

lar, are prone to permit a woman living with a man as his
wife, without the benefit of legal ceremony, or even as regular mistress, to be designated as a beneficiary and to
recover the policy proceeds"); 2 J.
Insurance Law and Practice, § 781

Appleman & J. Appleman,

(1966 & Supp. 1982)

("in

the absence of statutory contractual restriction, the utmost
freedom exists as to who may be designated as a beneficiary.
And where the right to so designate is given by contract,
that right should neither be curtailed nor abrogated.

The

intention of the insured is the controlling element •••• •
(emphasis added)).

v.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
The District Court granted respondents' Motion for Summaty

Judgment on the basis of the insured's intent alone.
-15-

The Court's findings made it unnecessary for the Court to
consider other issues which were raised by the pleadings.

It

was unnecessary to consider LINA's Cross-Claim against
respondent, Shirley.

It was also unnecessary to consider

LINA's claims that it is absolved of liability by reason of
good faith payment to Shirley.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-30 (1974) absolves an insurer who
makes payment of policy proceeds in good faith to one who
appears to be entitled to payment before any written conflicting notice of claim is received by the insurer.
made payment to Shirley on December 15, 1980.

LINA

Appellant

admits that she first sent written notice of claim to this
respondent on January 28, 1981.

Upon Shirley's representa-

tion that she was the wife of the insured, LINA made payment
in good faith.
Many cases have held that good faith payment of life
insurance proceeds to one who appears to be the beneficiary
absolves the insurance company of further responsibility if
payment is made before the insurer receives notice of conflicting claims and if the insurer acts reasonably.

See Weed

v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 288 F.2d 463, 464-65 (5th Cir.
1961): Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 1264, 1273
(Kan. 1983): Renchie v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 174
S.W.2d 87 (App. Ct. Tex. 1943): John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
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v. Sally, 163 S.W.2d 652 (App. Ct. Tex. 1942); Avondale
__

Camp W. O. W., 134 Neb. 717, 279 N.W. 355

11938);
t 13,

Grand Lodge of Colorado K. P. v. Harris, 109 Miss.

68 So.

75 (1915); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

f:() u is vi 11 e Trust Co • , 2 8 Ky • 4 2 6,

89

S • W. 2 6 8 ( 19 O5) •

while

the statutory language is less than clear, any other interpretation renders the statute meaningless.

Paying the pro-

ceeds to the correct beneficiary is all the insured is
required to do under the terms of the insurance contract.
The statute is not necessary in order to absolve the insurer
of any liability if correct payment is made.

It is presumed

that the legislature would not pass useless, meaningless or
futile legislation.

Haddenham v. Laramie, 648 P.2d 551, 554

(Wyo. 1982); Walker v. National Fin. Corp., 102 Idaho 266,
629

P.2d 662, 664 (1981); State ex rel. Irvin, Inc. v.

Anderson, 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564, 570 (1974).
The resolution of this issue is not important to this
appeal, however, because the District Court did not address
this issue.

If the Trial Court's decision is not affirmed,

this case should be remanded for further proceedings.
Further, respondent, LINA, filed a Cross-Claim against
Shirley in this case.

The District Court's decision made it

unnecessary to address the issues raised by that Cross-Compla int.

If judgment of the Trial Court is not affirmed, this
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case should be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The insurance policies which are the subject of this controversy, like any contract, must be interpreted in light of
the intention of the parties.

Here, Brent's obvious intent

that Shirley receive the insurance proceeds controls.

The

insurance policies contained provisions which designated who
would receive the proceeds if the insured failed to name
specific beneficiaries.

The District Court found that the

term "wife" as used in these provisions was intended to
include the person the insured considered to be his wife and
that Brent expected and intended that Shirley would receive
the proceeds of the these life insurance policies.
trict Court's finding, upon stipulated facts,

The Dis-

is a finding of

fact which is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must be sustained.

The appellant is unable to point to

any law or public policy which would prevent this Court
recognizing the relationship between Brent and Shirley in
equity for the limited purpose of payment of the insurance
proceeds according to Brent's intent.

The District Court's

decision should be affirmed in all respects and the respondent,

Insurance Company of North America, should be granted
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costs.

11

,

In the alternative, this case should be remanded
proceedings.

[J/1Tt:D

day of October, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

H.
egg
Attorneys for Responden
Insurance Company of North
America
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